Russia in Europe and the West. CEPS Commentaries, 1 April 2010 by Emerson, Michael.
 
 
Michael Emerson is Senior Research Fellow and head of the EU Foreign, Security and Neighbourhood 
Policies research programme at CEPS. He is the former EU ambassador to Russia. 
CEPS Commentaries offer concise, policy-oriented insights into topical issues in European affairs. This 
Commentary also appeared as the editorial in the April issue of CEPS News. The views expressed are 
attributable only to the author in a personal capacity and not to any institution with which he is 
associated. 
Available for free downloading from the CEPS website (http://www.ceps.eu) y © CEPS 2010 
Russia in Europe and the West 
Michael Emerson 
1 April 2010 
wo swallows do not a summer make, as the old saying goes. And so you are cautioned. 
But still one can catch sight of two swallows in the air, suggesting that maybe the time is 
coming for a new and positive turn to Russia’s relations with Europe and the 
transatlantic community.  
The first swallow is Russia’s ratification of Protocol 14 of the Convention on the European 
Court of Human Rights. This may sound like just a technical detail, but it is more than that. 
Protocol 14 is about reforming some rules and procedures of the Court to make it capable of 
handling more easily the huge increase in cases that are being submitted to it, and foremost from 
Russia. Of the 47 member states of the Council of Europe, Russia has been the last to ratify, 
after four years of hesitation. The delay was widely interpreted as a blocking tactic, 
undermining the Court from functioning effectively, which would mean undermining the cause 
of human rights in Europe. In interpreting this successful ratification, some independent Russian 
lawyers are saying that this was a decision favoured at the highest level by President Medvedev 
in order to improve the rule of law within Russia, since the case law of the Court is mandatory 
upon national legal systems. Hallelujah! 
The second swallow has come from Germany where Volker Ruehe (former defence minister) 
and General Klaus Naumann (former chief of staff of the German armed forces) published an 
article in Der Spiegel on 8 March, recommending that the question of NATO membership for 
Russia be put back on the agenda. The idea is not for a regular membership action plan, but 
rather that politically the perspective of future membership would be adopted as the frame 
through which to radically change the sense of thinking and debate about Russia’s strategic 
security relationship with NATO and Europe.  These authors are not naïve, and are quick to 
point out that the NATO alliance “is also an alliance of values and it will take some time before 
Russia fully satisfies these criteria”.   
Why should this bold proposition be taken up now? For an interesting accumulation of reasons.  
First, it is clear that President Medvedev’s draft European Security Treaty is not going to fly. It 
may be subject to endless talks in the OSCE’s Corfu process, but the bottom line is that this is 
neither technically nor politically (for most NATO member states) a plausible proposition. It is 
too selective in taking up only some of the Helsinki Final Act principles (the hard security ones, 
ignoring the human dimension) and otherwise is a thinly disguised proposal to curtail NATO's 
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expansion. Therefore all the more reason to turn this proposition on its head, open the prospect 
of Russian accession, which would at the same time dissolve the Ukraine issue. 
Second, Russia now seems understandably to be more preoccupied with its Asian flanks, given 
the risks of destabilisation in Central Asia, and the exposure of the thinly populated Russian Far 
East to the rising power of China, all notwithstanding the formalities of the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organisation. Under the circumstances, better then tidy up its much more benign 
Western front (those little Abkhazia and Transnistria affairs) and regroup with the West in 
NATO.    
Third, Russia is increasingly alarmed at the failure of its ‘modernisation’ concept for the 
economy.  To be successful, this is going to need a profound opening and confidence-building 
with the West and the EU in particular. Russia cannot conceivably become an EU member state, 
but it could with a big stretch of the imagination join NATO. Joining NATO as an alliance of 
values would go well with broad economic integration with Europe.  
Fourth is the new agreement between Russia and the United States to cut their nuclear arsenals 
in a new Start Treaty. President Obama goes even further, advocating a nuclear-free world, 
maybe even in his lifetime.   Russia's reconciliation with the West and NATO, to become 
prospective allies rather than presumed enemies – as the script calls for in the war games of 
nuclear strategists – would already represent a huge step in the right direction. 
And finally, for Russia to come really closer to Europe, there has to be some strong backbone to 
the proposition, rather than an endless succession of woolly strategy documents that mean little. 
A NATO membership perspective would be a game-changing move. And is this not what all 
parties – Russia, the EU and the US – basically want?  